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# COOPERATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR WITH NATIONAL PROMOTIONAL BANKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE

ELTI General Assembly, Prague

October 20, 2023

# Agenda

- 1. Introduction**
- 2. NPBLs in theory**
- 3. Distribution models of NPBLs**
- 4. Financial instruments**
- 5. Conclusion**

## Introductory notes

- Private commercial banks often suffer from market failures → governments created National Promotional Banks and Institutions (NPBIs) that are a subset of National Development Banks (NDBs) in the academic literature
- 3 questions to be answered today:
  - 1) What is the theoretical background of NPBIs?
  - 2) What is the best distribution model for NPBIs (direct/indirect/hybrid)?
  - 3) What is the role of NPBIs as financial instruments' providers in the EU?

## Information about the speaker

- 2022+ Executive Director, **Institute of Sustainable Finance**, Faculty of Finance and Accounting, Prague University of Economics and Business, Czech Rep.
- 2021 Author of a study „**The National Development Bank of the Czech Republic**“ (Narodni rozvojova banka, “NRB”) conducted by Prague University of Economics and Business
- 2014+ Vice-Chairman of the Supervisory Board, **Czech Export Bank**
- 2009+ Researcher at Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, **Charles University**, Czech Rep.

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## Theoretical background

- NPBIs/NDBs = specialized financial institutions with the official mandate to fulfill public policy objectives
- NDBs can address **market failures** unlike commercial banks: i) long-term finance; ii) credit rationing as a result of information asymmetry, lack of collateral, and risk aversion; iii) procyclical lending.
- NDBs also deal with **suboptimal market conditions** (e.g. high interest rates)
- 5 types of NDBs:
  - I. Multilateral development banks (EBRD, EIB),
  - II. National development banks (**NRB** in the Czech Republic),
  - III. Green development banks (UK, US, Switzerland),
  - IV. Export-import banks (**Czech Export Bank** in the Czech Republic),
  - V. Export credit agencies (EGAP in the Czech Republic)

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## Distribution models

- NDBs should complement rather than compete with commercial banks → NDBs should fill the market gap through offering tailored-made products and services for a particular segment (e.g. SME\*, municipalities), industry (energy), company needs (mezzanine capital for infrastructure projects) or products reflecting political goals (affordable housing)
- Product manufacturing vs product distribution → appropriate business model
- Distribution models of EU funds/products to clients:
  - a) **direct model** (NDB without commercial banks),
  - b) **indirect model** (NDB with commercial banks: KfW),
  - c) **hybrid model** (combination of the previous models: NRB).

\*Small and Medium Enterprises



# Direct distribution model



- Some NDBs have a lower level of monitoring skills and quality than commercial banks because of undue political intervention

Source: Author inspired KfW (2023). Investor presentation. October 2023

# Indirect distribution model



Source: KfW (2023). Investor presentation. October 2023


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# Financial instruments

- Financial instruments in the EU: loan, guarantee, equity investment, project bond, subsidized interest rates
- Common task for NDBs in the EU: administration of EU funds and financial instruments
- **Grants (subsidies) are usually preferred by politicians/government officials to financial instruments** → typically (not only) for the Czech Rep.
- **Financial additionality** (financing on terms and conditions not available in the market) vs **non-financial additionality** (political risk cover, knowledge transfer, capacity building)
- Key reasons: one-off grants (vs. revolving nature of financial instruments); similar administrative burden of grants and financial instruments (typically, obtaining a loan requires less information compared to the extensive documentation needed when applying for a grant)
- **NPBIs should evaluate the multiplier effect of their products** (e.g. an economic benefit of 1 Euro provided by a NPBI) → evidence-based decisions

# Grants vs financial instruments



Source: Nyikos, G. et al. (2020). Do financial instruments or grants have a bigger effect on SMEs' access to finance? Evidence from Hungary. *Journal of Entrepreneurship in Emerging Economies*, 12 (5): 667-685.

## NPBIs as long-term investors

- The maturity-lengthening role of NPBIs is more feasible if they are:
  - I. **well capitalized\***,
  - II. have proper liquidity management,
  - III. possess adequate amounts of liquid asset holdings.
- **Assumption: NPBIs are well-governed and have high monitoring skills**
- Poorly managed NPBIs, which do not keep out narrow private and politically vested interests, will probably end up in a fragile financial position with high nonperforming loans and low credibility.
- The maturity-lengthening role of NPBIs is more relevant for countries that have governments with stronger credibility, finances, and net worth than countries with governments plagued by credibility concerns, over-indebtedness, and excessive fiscal deficits.

\* It depends on the level of bank regulation (e.g. the NRB is heavily regulated because it has a full banking license and follows CRR II/CRD V, what is not so common in the EU).

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## Concluding remarks

1. NPBIs should complement commercial banks
2. The hybrid distribution model combines advantages of direct and indirect models
3. Under-capitalized NPBIs have limited capacity for long-term lending and financial instruments.



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6. Appendix

# Empirical research on NDBs 1/2

## Positives of NDBs

- i) NDBs lend longer than commercial banks,
- ii) NDBs finance projects with positive externalities,
- iii) NDBs address market failures in the syndicated loan market,
- iv) NDBs act countercyclically during global liquidity cycles,
- v) NDBs recently focus more on ESG\* and sustainability,
- vi) NDBs can fulfill the “ESG non-compliant“ gap (financing “non-green“ assets).

\*Environmental, Social, Governance

# Empirical research on NDBs 2/2

## Challenges for NDBs

- i) NDBs suffer from government failures owing to their poor corporate governance and political capture,
- ii) NDBs provide cheap credits to politically-connected firms that could have obtained financial support from commercial banks,
- iii) NDBs increase their lending activity in election years,
- iv) NDBs subsidizes firms that could fund their projects with alternative sources of capital,
- v) NDBs are not significant players in some countries (e.g. in the CR)

## Useful sources

1. European Commission (2023). The Role of Public Development Banks & Institutions in the Implementation of the United Nations' Agenda 2030: A Survey in Europe. Discussion Paper 179, February 2023
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# Thanks for your attention.

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